

## 参考文献

ロストウの著作のうち邦訳で読めるのは上で紹介した『経済成長の諸段階：一つの非共産主義宣言』（木村健康・久保まち子・村上泰亮訳，ダイヤモンド社，1961）のほか，その姉妹編である1952年に発表された *The Process of Economic Growth* が『経済成長の過程』（酒井正三郎・北川一雄訳，東洋経済新報社，1955）として翻訳されている。また援助政策をとりあげたメリカンの共著 *A Proposal Key to Effective Foreign Policy* (1957) は『後進国開発計画の諸問題—新しい国際関係への提案』（日本外政学会，1958）として翻訳されている。他に、『政治と経済の諸段階』（高坂・山野・戸部訳，ダイヤモンド社，1975），『21世紀への出発：ケインズ経済学を越えて』（坂本二郎・足立文彦訳，ダイヤモンド社，1980年）等がある。

#### 第4章 アレクサンダー・ガーシェンクロン 「歴史的視野から見た経済的後進性」

(Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*)

##### (1) テキスト

- (A) A good deal of our thinking about industrialization of backward countries is dominated — consciously or unconsciously — by the grand Marxian generalization according to which it is the history of advanced or established industrial countries which traces out the road of development for the more backward countries. “The industrially more developed country presents to the less developed country a picture of the latter’s future.” There is little doubt that in some broad sense this generalization has validity. It is meaningful to say that Germany, between the middle and the end of the last century, followed the road which England began to tread at an earlier time. But one should beware of accepting such a generalization too wholeheartedly. For the half-truth that it contains is likely to conceal the existence of the other half — that is to say, in several very important respects the development of a backward country may, by the very virtue of its backwardness, tend to differ fundamentally from that of an advanced country.
- (B) It is the main proposition of this essay that in a number of important historical instances industrialization processes, when launched

at length in a backward country, showed considerable differences, as compared with more advanced countries, not only with regard to the speed of the development (the rate of industrial growth) but also with regard to the productive and organizational structures of industry which emerged from those processes. Furthermore, these differences in the speed and character of industrial development were to a considerable extent the result of application of institutional instruments for which there was little or no counterpart in an established industrial country. In addition, the intellectual climate within which industrialization proceeded, its "spirit" or "ideology," differed considerably among advanced and backward countries. Finally, the extent to which these attributes of backwardness occurred in individual instances appears to have varied directly with the degree of backwardness and the natural industrial potentialities of the countries concerned.

- (C) Let us first describe in general terms a few basic elements in the industrialization processes of backward countries as synthesized from the available historical information on economic development of European countries in the nineteenth century and up until the beginning of the First World War. Thereupon, on the basis of concrete examples, more will be said on the effects of what may be called "relative backwardness" upon the course of industrial development in individual countries.
- (D) The typical situation in a backward country prior to the initiation of considerable industrialization processes may be described as characterized by the tension between the actual state of economic activities

in the country and the existing obstacles to industrial development, on the one hand, and the great promise inherent in such a development, on the other. The extent of opportunities that industrialization presents varied, of course, with the individual country's endowment of natural resources. Furthermore, no industrialization seemed possible, and hence no "tension" existed, as long as certain formidable institutional obstacles (such as the serfdom of the peasantry or the far-reaching absence of political unification) remained. Assuming an adequate endowment of usable resources, and assuming that the great blocks to industrialization had been removed, the opportunities inherent in industrialization may be said to vary directly with the backwardness of the country. Industrialization always seemed the more promising the greater the backlog of technological innovations which the backward country could take over from the more advanced country. Borrowed technology, so much and so rightly stressed by Veblen, was one of the primary factors assuring a high speed of development in a backward country entering the stage of industrialization. There always has been the inevitable tendency to deride the backward country because of its lack of originality. German mining engineers of the sixteenth century accused the English of being but slavish imitators of German methods, and the English fully reciprocated these charges in the fifties and sixties of the past century. In our own day, Soviet Russia has been said to have been altogether imitative in its industrial development, and the Russians have retorted by making extraordinary and extravagant claims. But all these superficialities

tend to blur the basic fact that the contingency of large imports of foreign machinery and of foreign know-how, and the concomitant opportunities for rapid industrialization with the passage of time, increasingly widened the gulf between economic potentialities and economic actualities in backward countries.

## (2) 英文解釈のためのノート

- A. “The industrially more developed country presents to the less developed country a picture of the latter’s future.” : 「工業的により進んだ国は、より発展の進んでいない国に、それ自身の未来の姿を示す。」マルクスが『資本論』の「まえがき」に書き付けたフレーズ。
- B. the degree of backwardness : 後進性の程度
- C. relative backwardness : 相対的後進性
- D. endowment of natural resources : 天然資源の賦存  
the serfdom of peasantry : 農奴制  
Veblen : ソースタイン・ヴェブレン (Thorstein Veblen, 1857-1929). アメリカで活躍した代表的な制度派経済学者。

## (3) テキストの概要と解説

本テキストは、Alexander Gerschenkron, “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective” (1952) 論文から一部を抜粋したものである。ガーシェンクロンの同名の論文集『歴史的視野から見た経済的後進性 (*Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*)』(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1962) に収録されている。

本論文は、19世紀ヨーロッパの工業化について論じたものである。とりわけイギリス、フランス、ドイツ、ロシアの4カ国をとりあげ、各国工業化の性格の相違を描きだしたものである。工業化の型の相違をもたらす基本的な要因は、各国の「相対的後進性」である、というのが本論文での主張である。

## 第5章 ラグナー・ヌルクセ「貧困の悪循環」

(Ragnar Nurkse, Vicious Circle of Poverty)

### (1) テキスト

- (A) 'A country is poor because it is poor.' This seems a trite proposition but it does express the circular relationships that afflict both the demand and the supply side of the problem of capital formation in economically backward areas. This paper will discuss some international aspects of the difficulties on both sides. It will take up only a few points and cannot even attempt to give anything like a balanced picture.
- (B) The inducement to invest is limited by the size of the market. That is essentially what Allyn Young brought out in his reinterpretation of Adam Smith's famous thesis. What determines the size of the market? Not simply money demand, nor mere numbers of people, nor physical area. Transport facilities, which Adam Smith singled out for special emphasis, are important: reductions in transport costs (artificial as well as natural) do enlarge the market in the economic as well as the geographical sense. But reductions in any cost of production tend to have that effect. So the size of the market is determined by the general level of productivity. Capacity to buy means capacity to produce. In its turn, the level of productivity depends—not entirely by any means, but largely—on the

use of capital in production. But the use of capital is inhibited, to start with, by the small size of the market.

- (C) Where is the way out of this circle? How can the market be enlarged? Although in backward areas Say's Law may be valid in the sense that there is generally no deflationary gap, it never is valid in the sense that the output of any single industry, newly set up with capital equipment, can create its own demand. Human wants being various, the people engaged in the new industry will not wish to spend all their income on their own products. Suppose it is a shoe industry. If in the rest of the economy nothing happens to increase productivity and hence buying power, the market for the new shoe output is likely to prove deficient. People in the rest of the economy will not give up other things in order to buy, say, a pair of shoes every year, if they do not have enough food, clothing, and shelter. They cannot let go the little they have of these elementary necessities. If they were willing to give up some of their present consumption in exchange for an annual pair of new shoes, these things would be available for the shoe workers to make up the balance in their own consumption needs. As it is, the new industry is likely to be a failure.
- (D) The difficulty is not due fundamentally to discontinuities in the technical forms of capital equipment, though these may accentuate it. It is due above all to the inevitable inelasticity of demands at low real-income levels. It is in this way that lack

of buying power cramps the inducement to invest in any individual industry.

(E) The difficulty is not present, however, in the case of a more or less synchronized application of capital to a wide range of different industries. Here the result is an overall enlargement of the market and hence an escape from the deadlock. People working with more and better tools in a number of complementary projects become each other's customers. Most industries catering for mass consumption are complementary in the sense that they provide a market for, and thus support, each other. This basic complementarity stems, of course, from the diversity of human wants. The case for 'balanced growth' rests ultimately on the need for a 'balanced diet'.

(F) The notion of balance is inherent in Say's Law. Take Mill's formulation of it: 'Every increase of production, if distributed without miscalculation among all kinds of produce in the proportion which private interest would dictate, creates, or rather constitutes, its own demand.' Here, in a nutshell, is the case for balanced growth. An increase in the production of shoes alone does not create its own demand. An increase in production over a wide range of consumables, so balanced as to correspond with the pattern of consumers' preferences, does create its own demand.

(G) How do we get balanced growth? Ordinary price incentives may bring it about by small degrees, though here the technic-

al discontinuities can be a serious hindrance; besides, slow growth is just not good enough where population pressure exists. In the evolution of Western industrial capitalism, rapid growth was achieved, in Schumpeter's view, through the action of creative entrepreneurs producing spurts of industrial progress. Even though innovations originated each time in a particular industry, the monetary effects and other circumstances were such as to promote each time a wave of new applications of capital over a whole range of industries. It is easy to see how a frontal attack of this sort can succeed while yet any sizable investment in any particular industry may be discouraged by the limits of the existing market.

(H) Other types of society may feel a need for some degree of central direction to produce the desired effect — at any rate initially. But whether balanced growth is enforced by government planning or achieved spontaneously by private enterprise is, in a sense, a question of method. Whichever method is adopted, the nature of the solution aimed at may be the same, though the 'miscalculation' Mill warned against seems hard to avoid in either case.

---

\* Reprinted from *The American Economic Review*, May 1952.

## 第6章 アーサー・ルイス「無制限労働供給下の経済発展」

(W. Arthur Lewis, *Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour*\*)

### (1) テキスト

(A) 1. This essay is written in the classical tradition, making the classical assumption, and asking the classical question. The classics, from Smith to Marx, all assumed, or argued, that an unlimited supply of labour was available at subsistence wages. They then enquired how production grows through time. They found the answer in capital accumulation, which they explained in terms of their analysis of the distribution of income. Classical systems thus determined simultaneously income distribution and income growth, with the relative prices of commodities as a minor by-product.

(B) Interest in prices and in income distribution survived into the neo-classical era, but labour ceased to be unlimited in supply, and the formal model of economic analysis was no longer expected to explain the expansion of the system through time. These changes of assumption and of interest served well enough in the European parts of the world, where labour was indeed limited in supply, and where for the next half century it looked as if economic expansion could indeed be assumed to be automatic. On the other hand over the greater part of Asia labour is unlimited in supply, and economic

expansion certainly cannot be taken for granted. Asia's problems, however, attracted very few economists during the neo-classical era (even the Asian economists themselves absorbed the assumptions and preoccupations of European economics) and hardly any progress has been made for nearly a century with the kind of economics which would throw light upon the problems of countries with surplus populations.

(C) When Keynes's *General Theory* appeared, it was thought at first that this was the book which would illuminate the problems of countries with surplus labour, since it assumed an unlimited supply of labour at the current price, and also, in its final pages, made a few remarks on secular economic expansion. Further reflection, however, revealed that Keynes's book assumed not only that labour is unlimited in supply, but also, and more fundamentally, that land and capital are unlimited in supply—more fundamentally both in the short run sense that once the monetary tap is turned the real limit to expansion is not physical resources but the limited supply of labour, and also in the long run sense that secular expansion is embarrassed not by a shortage but by a superfluity of saving. Given the Keynesian remedies the neo-classical system comes into its own again. Hence, from the point of view of countries with surplus labour, Keynesianism is only a footnote to neo-classicism—albeit a long, important and fascinating footnote. The student of such economies has

therefore to work right back to the classical economists before he finds an analytical framework into which he can relevantly fit his problems.

- (D) The purpose of this essay is thus to see what can be made of the classical framework in solving problems of distribution, accumulation, and growth, first in a closed and then in an open economy. It is not primarily an essay in the history of economic doctrine, and will not therefore spend time on individual writers, enquiring what they meant, or assessing its validity or truth. Our purpose is rather to bring their framework up-to-date, in the light of modern knowledge, and to see how far it then helps us to understand the contemporary problems of large areas of the earth.
- (E) 2. We have to begin by elaborating the assumption of an unlimited supply of labour, and by establishing that it is a useful assumption. We are not arguing, let it be repeated, that this assumption should be made for all areas of the world. It is obviously not true of the United Kingdom, or of North West Europe. It is not true either of some of the countries usually now lumped together as under-developed; for example there is an acute shortage of male labour in some parts of Africa and of Latin America. On the other hand it is obviously the relevant assumption for the economies of Egypt, of India, or of Jamaica. Our present task is not to supersede neo-classical economics, but merely to elaborate a different frame-

work for those countries which the neo-classical (and Keynesian) assumptions do not fit.

- (F) In the first place, an unlimited supply of labour may be said to exist in those countries where population is so large relatively to capital and natural resources, that large sectors of the economy where the marginal productivity of labour is negligible, zero, or even negative. Several writers have drawn attention to the existence of such "disguised" unemployment in the agricultural sector, demonstrating in each case that the family holding is so small that if some members of the family obtained other employment the remaining members could cultivate the holding just as well (of course they would have to work harder: the argument includes the proposition that they would be willing to work harder in these circumstances). The phenomenon is not, however, by any means confined to the countryside. Another large sector to which it applies is the whole range of casual jobs—the workers on the docks, the young men who rush forward asking to carry your bag as you appear, the jobbing gardener, and the like. These occupations usually have a multiple of the number they need, each of them earning very small sums from occasional employment; frequently their number could be halved without reducing output in this sector. Petty retail trading is also exactly of this type; it is enormously expanded in overpopulated economies; each trader makes only a few sales; markets are

crowded with stalls, and if the number of stalls were greatly reduced the consumers would be no whit worse off—they might even be better off, since retail margins might fall. Twenty years ago one could not write these sentences without having to stop and explain why in these circumstances, the casual labourers do not bid their earnings down to zero, or why the farmers' product is not similarly all eaten up in rent, but these propositions present no terrors to contemporary economists.

- (G) A little more explanation has to be given of those cases where, the workers are not self-employed, but are working for wages, since it is harder to believe that employers will pay wages exceeding marginal productivity. The most important of these sectors is domestic service, which is usually even more inflated in over-populated countries than is petty trading (in Barbados 16 per cent. of the population is in domestic service). The reason is that in over-populated countries the code of ethical behaviour so shapes itself that it becomes good form for each person to offer as much employment as he can. The line between employees and dependents is very thinly drawn. Social prestige requires people to have servants, and the grand seigneur may have to keep a whole army of retainers who are really little more than a burden upon his purse. This is found not only in domestic service, but in every sector of employment. Most businesses in under-developed coun-

tries employ a large number of "messengers," whose contribution is almost negligible; you see them sitting outside office doors, or hanging around in the courtyard. And even in the severest slump the agricultural or commercial employer is expected to keep his labour force somehow or other—it would be immoral to turn them out, for how would they eat, in countries where the only form of unemployment assistance is the charity of relatives? So it comes about that even in the sectors where people are working for wages, and above all the domestic sector, marginal productivity may be negligible or even zero.

- (H) Whether marginal productivity is zero or negligible is not, however, of fundamental importance to our analysis. The price of labour, in these economies, is a wage at the subsistence level (we define this later). The supply of labour is therefore "unlimited" so long as the supply of labour at this price exceeds the demand. In this situation, new industries can be created, or old industries expanded without limit at the existing wage; or, to put it more exactly, shortage of labour is no limit to the creation of new sources of employment. If we cease to ask whether the marginal productivity of labour is negligible and ask instead only the question from what sectors would additional labour be available if new industries were created offering employment at subsistence wages, the answer becomes even more comprehensive. For we

have then not only the farmers, the casuals, the petty traders and the retainers (domestic and commercial), but we have also three other classes from which to choose.

- (I) First of all, there are the wives and daughters of the household. The employment of women outside the household depends upon a great number of factors, religious and conventional, and is certainly not exclusively a matter of employment opportunities. There are, however, a number of countries where the current limit is for practical purposes only employment opportunities. This is true, for example, even inside the United Kingdom. The proportion of women gainfully employed in the U. K. varies enormously from one region to another according to employment opportunities for women. For example, in 1939 whereas there were 52 women gainfully employed for every 100 men in Lancashire, there were only 15 women gainfully employed for every 100 men in South Wales. Similarly in the Gold Coast, although there is an acute shortage of male labour, any industry which offered good employment to women would be besieged with applications. The transfer of women's work from the household to commercial employment is one of the most notable features of economic development. It is not by any means all gain, but the gain is substantial because most of the things which women otherwise do in the household can in fact be done much better or more cheaply outside, thanks to the large scale economies of

specialisation, and also to the use of capital (grinding grain, fetching water from the river, making cloth, making clothes, cooking the midday meal, teaching children, nursing the sick, etc.). One of the surest ways of increasing the national income is therefore to create new sources of employment for women outside the home.

- (J) The second source of labour for expanding industries is the increase in the population resulting from the excess of births over deaths. This source is important in any dynamic analysis of how capital accumulation can occur, and employment can increase, without any increase in real wages. It was therefore a cornerstone of Ricardo's system. Strictly speaking, population increase is not relevant either to the classical analysis, or to the analysis which follows in this article, unless it can be shown that the increase of population is caused by economic development and would not otherwise be so large. The proof of this proposition was supplied to the classical economists by the Malthusian law of population. There is already an enormous literature of the genus: "What Malthus *Really* Meant," into which we need not enter. Modern population theory has advanced little by analysing separately the effects of economic development upon the birth rate, and its effects on the death rate. Of the former, we know little. There is no evidence that the birth rate ever rises with economic development. In Western Europe it has fallen during

the last eighty years. We are not quite sure why; we suspect that it was for reasons associated with development, and we hope that the same thing may happen in the rest of the world as development spreads. Of the death rate we are more certain. It comes down with development from around 40 to around 12 per thousand; in the first stage because better communications and trade eliminate death from local famines; in the second stage because better public health facilities banish the great epidemic diseases of plague, smallpox, cholera, malaria, yellow fever (and eventually tuberculosis); and in the third stage because widespread facilities for treating the sick snatch from the jaws of death many who would otherwise perish in infancy or in their prime. Because the effect of development on the death rate is so swift and certain, while its effect on the birth rate is unsure and retarded, we can say for certain that the immediate effect of economic development is to cause the population to grow; after some decades it begins to grow (we hope) less rapidly. Hence in any society where the death rate is around 40 per thousand, the effect of economic development will be to generate an increase in the supply of labour.

- (K) Marx offered a third source of labour to add to the reserve army, namely the unemployment generated by increasing efficiency. Ricardo had admitted that the creation of machinery could reduce employment. Marx seized upon the

argument, and in effect generalised it, for into the pit of unemployment he threw not only those displaced by machinery, but also the self-employed and petty capitalists who could not compete with larger capitalists of increasing size, enjoying the benefits of the economies of scale. Nowadays we reject this argument on empirical grounds. It is clear that the effect of capital accumulation in the past has been to reduce the size of the reserve army, and not to increase it, so we have lost interest in arguments about what is "theoretically" possible.

- (L) When we take account of all the sources we have now listed—the farmers, the casuals, the petty traders, the retainers (domestic and commercial), women in the household, and population growth—it is clear enough that there can be in an over-populated economy an enormous expansion of new industries or new employment opportunities without any shortage of unskilled labour becoming apparent in the labour market. From the point of view of the effect of economic development on wages, the supply of labour is practically unlimited.
- (M) This applies only to unskilled labour. There may at any time be a shortage of skilled workers of any grade—ranging from masons, electricians or welders to engineers, biologists or administrators. Skilled labour may be the bottleneck in expansion, just like capital or land. Skilled labour, however, is only what Marshall might have called a "quasi-bottleneck," if he had not had so nice a sense of elegant language. For it is

only a very temporary bottleneck, in the sense that if the capital is available for development, the capitalists or their government will soon provide the facilities for training more skilled people. The real bottlenecks to expansion are therefore capital and natural resources, and we can proceed on the assumption that so long as these are available the necessary skills will be provided as well, though perhaps with some time lag.

---

\* Reprinted from *The Manchester School of Economics and Social Sciences*, vol.22 no.2, 1954.

(2) 英文解釈のためのノート

- A. the classical assumption : 古典派経済学の前提  
 the classics : 古典派経済学  
 an unlimited supply of labour : 無制限の労働供給  
 subsistence wage : 生存維持賃金 (生活あるいは生命を維持していくために必要なぎりぎりの賃金水準のこと)  
 the relative prices of commodities : 商品の相対価格  
 bye-product : “by-product”と同じ
- B. the neo-classical era : 新古典派経済学の時代  
 the formal model of economic development : 形式的な経済発展モデル
- C. Keynes's *General Theory* : ケインズの『一般理論』(J. M. ケインズ (John Maynard Keynes, 1883-1946) が1936年に発表した主著『雇用, 利子および貨幣の一般理論』(*The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*) のこと).  
 secular economic expansion : 永続的な経済拡大  
 in the short run sense : 短期の意味で  
 once the monetary tap is turned : ひとたび貨幣の栓が抜かれると (すなわち「貨幣供給が増加すると」という意味)  
 a superfluity of saving : 過剰貯蓄  
 Given the Keynesian remedies the neo-classical system comes into its own again : ケインズ学派的な治療法を所与とすると, 新古典派学的な【経済】システムが再びうまく働く (つまり完全雇用を達成するまではケインズ経済学に基づく有効需要創出政策が有効であるが, ひとたび完全雇用が達成